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Abstract 
The aim of this article is to show that wealth must be treated as a distinct dimension of social stratification 
alongside income. In a first step, we explain why social stratification researchers have largely overlooked 
wealth in the past and present a detailed definition of wealth by differentiating it from income. In the 
empirical part of the article, we analyze the distribution of wealth across 18 countries, and we describe 
and compare national patterns of wealth inequality to those of income inequality making use of different 
data sources. Our results show – first – that there is strong variation in the distribution of wealth between 
these 18 countries, and – second – that levels of wealth inequality significantly differ from levels of 
income inequality in about half of the countries analyzed. Surprisingly high levels of wealth inequality we 
find in Sweden and Denmark, two countries widely considered being highly egalitarian societies. 
Conversely, the Southern European countries – where income inequality is relatively high – exhibit 
comparatively low levels of wealth inequality. 
Keywords 
Income inequality, net worth, social inequality, social stratification, wealth inequality 
Introduction 
International comparative research on social inequality shows that modern societies exhibit very different 
and distinct patterns of social inequality, with its level and persistency depending strongly on national 
institutional settings. Most studies within this field, however, consider social inequalities fundamentally in 
terms of inequalities deriving from the labor market (especially in terms of 
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income inequality), while neglecting the relevance of wealth in the stratification process. Especially during 
phases of economic insecurity, such as illness or retirement, wealth is of great importance to stabilize 
consumption, in particular in less generous welfare states. Studying wealth becomes even more relevant 
when we consider how intergenerational transfers serve as powerful social mechanisms that can 
reproduce and intensify existing social inequalities. Moreover, given the aging of industrialized societies, 
along with the growing importance of private savings in the course of the most recent pension reforms all 
over Europe, wealth will probably serve as a crucial source of individuals' well-being in modern societies 
(cf. Davies and Shorrocks, 2000: 608). The few empirical studies conducted until now which analyze the 
relationship between income and wealth were able to show that the correlation between the two 
measures is much weaker than one might expect, ranging from 0.3 to 0.5 (e.g. Keister and Moeller, 2000; 
Wolff, 2006). Moreover, wealth has been found to affect various social outcomes like education, 
occupation, health, or wellbeing, even after controlling for income (Bonini, 2007; Meer et al., 2003; Pfeffer 
and Hällsten, 2014), indicating its social stratification effects. Thus, it is reasonable to assume that studies 
addressing only income are likely to paint a one-sided or even inaccurate picture of economic and, in a 
broader sense, social inequalities. 
With this article, we intend to contribute to a broader understanding of social inequality by going beyond 
inequalities derived from the labor market and drawing attention to wealth as an important but often 
neglected variable – both on a conceptual and methodological level – in social stratification research (cf. 
Piketty, 2014). In a first step, we explain why social stratification researchers have largely overlooked 
wealth in the past. Moreover, we formulate theoretical arguments as to why wealth must be treated as a 
distinct dimension of social stratification alongside income. In this context, we also present a detailed 
definition of wealth by differentiating it from income. In the empirical part of the article, we analyze the 
distribution of wealth, and we describe and compare national patterns of wealth inequality to those of 
income inequality. We apply hierarchical cluster methods to find clusters of countries with similar levels of 
wealth and income inequality. The aim of this article is, first, to find out how private wealth is distributed in 
different countries and, second, to find out if national patterns of wealth inequality resemble those of 
income inequality. This article shall be understood as a descriptive introduction to the topic of cross-
national wealth studies within the framework of social stratification research. 
For our descriptive analyses, we make use of a number of different data sources: the Survey of Health, 
Ageing and Retirement in Europe (SHARE), Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) income data, and the wealth data provided by the Global Wealth Databooks (GWD) (Credit 
Suisse Research Institute, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013). We compare income and wealth holdings across 17 
European countries and one country from the Middle East (Israel). 
The longtime disregard of wealth in social stratification research 
Despite the relevance of wealth for the process of social stratification, serious research on wealth has, for 
a very long time, almost exclusively been conducted in the field of economics (Atkinson, 1971; Davies 
and Shorrocks, 2000; Wolff, 2006). We attribute this oversight to both substantive and empirical factors. 
At the end of the Second World War, the ownership and accumulation of wealth was still the preserve of 
elite groups in society. Consequently, wealth was mainly understood in terms of power, and wealth 
research was assigned to the field of elite sociology (e.g. Le Bon, 1939; Michels, 1925; Mosca, 1950: cf. 
Spilerman, 2000). Only thereafter, in times of economic prosperity, political stability, and peace in the 
industrialized countries, did wealth become a quantitatively significant economic resource for the 
population as a whole. Nevertheless, social stratification research tends
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to be overly focused on inequalities deriving solely from the labor market (occupational status and/ or 
earnings), while neglecting the relevance of wealth in the stratification process. 
Functionalist theories of social stratification understand societies as operating on meritocratic principles, 
and consider wealth only if it is self-generated (life-cycle wealth). Transferred wealth contradicts the 
principles of equal opportunity and merit, and is not taken into account. Theories of social class are 
oriented toward labor market processes, with a strong focus on the individual actor. Their main interest is 
the organization of work in modern industrial societies. Accordingly, wealth is discussed only peripherally. 
Marx' concept of class (see, for example, Grusky, 2008: 74-90) is derived directly from the individual's 
position in the production system. Yet, in addition to the two main classes in capitalism – the proletariat 
and the bourgeoisie – Marx also mentioned the petty bourgeoisie and landowners, whose social position 
is based on their ownership of means of production. In later approaches, such as in the work of Bourdieu 
(1984, 1986), Dahrendorf (1959) and Durkheim (2008), the concept of class is extended, and wealth is 
considered more explicitly. Weber's (1922) class concept provides the most explicit discussion of wealth; 
he understands the ownership of property as representing the main difference between classes. Weber 
differentiates between the property class – consisting of entrepreneurs (who use their wealth in 
commercial ventures) and rentiers (who profit by interest on their property) – and the property-less class, 
defined by the kinds of services they provide in the labor market. 
Since the 1980s, theories of social environments (milieus) and lifestyles have tried to offer a holistic 
approach to the explanation of social life and continue to emphasize the multidimensionality of social 
inequality. They deny that one's occupational position is the single most important feature in the definition 
of social class, resulting in a change of perspective from the individual actor to the family as the most 
important unit in the process of social stratification. Social stratification is no longer understood as a state, 
but as a process that develops over the life course, and is subject to changes. As the accumulation of 
wealth is such a process, unfolding over the whole life course, it can be best approached by adopting a 
life course perspective (Elder, 1975; Kohli, 1986; Mayer and Müller, 1986). The process of wealth 
accumulation is strongly related to and interdependent on important life course events (e.g. marriage, 
divorce, childbirth, death of the spouse) and other life course processes (e.g. occupational or family 
trajectories). Unfortunately, even now there is a lack of suitable data to enable an empirical analysis of 
these interdependent processes, trajectories and events, which brings us to the empirical reasons for the 
longtime disregard of wealth in social stratification research. 
The first wealth survey to have been conducted was in the United States in the 1960s (when the already 
established ‘Survey of Financial Characteristics of Consumers' added a wealth module). A number of 
similar studies in the United States were to follow, but not until 1980; in other industrialized countries, 
wealth studies such as these only appeared as late as the 1990s and 2000s. In addition, a number of 
cross-national wealth surveys (e.g. the Luxembourg Wealth Study (LWS), the Household Finance and 
Consumption Survey (HFCS) and the Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement (SHARE)) have started 
recently. Nevertheless, many surveys cover only relatively short periods, so they allow us to study the 
accumulation of wealth from a ‘real' life course perspective only in some years. 
In recent years, however, sociologists have become interested in studying wealth (e.g. Elmelech, 2008; 
Keister and Moeller, 2000; Semyonov and Lewin-Epstein, 2011; Spilerman, 2000). The increasing 
relevance of wealth in social stratification research is likely to be related to some more recent social and 
political developments. The first is population aging and the accompanying public pension retirement limit 
set by the modern welfare states. These factors turned old age into a distinct phase of life. This life stage 
is much less structured by labor market activity, while leisure and consumption become increasingly 
important (Kohli, 1988). Thus, as individuals grow older,
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wealth increasingly determines their economic status, while income becomes less meaningful. The 
second reason is the increasing importance of private provision for old age. As a reaction to population 
aging, welfare states nowadays reduce public pension benefits and try to set incentives for private 
provision for old age. Responsibility for old-age provision is increasingly being transferred from the 
welfare state to the individual actor, which makes the accumulation of private wealth an even more 
relevant topic for the overall population. 
Wealth and income – Definitional issues 
While both income and wealth are important features of individual economic standing, each has different 
properties. Income, generally understood to be earned income, is a flow measure that represents a 
snapshot of an economic entity's financial situation at a certain point in time, or over a minor interval 
(usually a week, month, or year). It can vary considerably from one period to the next and is restricted to 
persons or households who actively engage in the labor force (earned income), or who were engaged in 
the labor force at some time in the past (transferred income). In contrast, wealth is a stock measure, 
which – originating from a certain value – increases by inflows and decreases by outflows. Stock 
measures feature the following distinct characteristics: they represent the state of a system and are thus 
the basis for decision-making, they bring inertia, history and memory to the system by accumulating 
events of the past, and they allow delays and enable dynamic imbalances between inflows and outflows 
(Forrester, 1961, 1968). In this regard, the economic unit of a person or household can be understood as 
a system. Accumulated assets represent the system's material condition. Based on these assets, the 
economic unit will make decisions regarding, for example, consumption and investment. Larger short-
term changes in the stock of wealth are possible, for example, through inheritances or poor investments. 
These changes are, however, infrequent events often correlating with decisive life changes (like the death 
of one's parents). As such, the stock of wealth accumulated represents resources of the individual's past, 
present, and future (potential) financial well-being (Cowell et al., 2012). Correspondingly, Spilerman 
(2000) understands wealth as an individual's or household's consumption potential, or more precisely, its 
capacity to maintain a particular standard of living. 
In addition, the process of wealth accumulation is a typical process of cumulative advantage (DiPrete and 
Eirich, 2006). Once a certain amount of wealth is accumulated, it will replicate itself through the 
mechanism of compound interest. At the same time, the state of having no or only low wealth is likely to 
be persistent over time. This is one important reason why the distribution of wealth is likely to be more 
unequal than the distribution of income. Over and above, this is related to the fact that compared to the 
distribution of income, the distribution of wealth is much more likely to show extreme outliers on the top of 
the distribution. Various scholars argue that in the United States, for example, the top 1 percent of the 
wealth distribution holds nearly 50 percent of total wealth (Davies et al., 2009; Wolff, 2002). 
Finally, the functions of wealth are much broader than those of income, which can be either saved (or 
invested) or consumed. Frick and Grabka (2009b: 579) name seven functions of wealth. As already 
stated above, wealth has the characteristic of replicating itself through the mechanism of compound 
interest, resulting in the generation of further income (income function). Non-financial assets such as 
property, vehicles, or art all share the function of utility, be it in the form of recreation, greater 
independence, or other direct benefits (utility function). In the case of an expected or unexpected 
decrease or loss of income, wealth can serve to stabilize consumption (security function). Wealth can 
also provide access to political power (power function), and it can be used to achieve or maintain high 
levels of social status (social status maintenance function). In addition, wealth can serve to finance the 
education of one's children or grandchildren
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(socialization function), and – perhaps most importantly – wealth can be transferred over generations 
(inheritance function) and might thus serve as a powerful social mechanism to reproduce or intensify 
existing social inequalities. 
According to Meade (1964, 1975), the wealth of an economic entity at a certain time is determined by age 
and the history of earnings (starting with birth), saving rates (or consumption rates), and rates of return 
plus inheritances and gifts. Total wealth can thus be decomposed into two components: self-accumulated 
wealth (life-cycle wealth) and transferred wealth (via inter vivos transfer or bequests) (Davies and 
Shorrocks, 2000; Gale and Scholz, 1994). In order to analyze and understand wealth inequalities, it is 
crucial to know whether most of the accumulated wealth holdings stem from saved income or from 
transferred wealth. This question is, however, very difficult to answer, as one would need detailed 
longitudinal information about personal income and wealth for at least two consecutive generations, which 
is not widely available, if at all. 
For the Unites States, however, many studies exist which either directly estimate the contribution of life-
cycle wealth to total wealth, simulate the bequeathing behavior of overlapping generations, or measure 
transferred wealth via surveys that directly ask respondents about the percentage of total wealth they 
received through transfers (Gale and Scholz, 1994). Results from the first and second types of studies 
are very heterogeneous with estimates of the contribution of transferred wealth to total wealth ranging 
from less than 20 percent (Modigliani, 1988a, 1988b) to approximately 80 percent (Kotlikoff and 
Summers, 1981; White, 1978). Survey studies are more consistent, and estimate the contribution of 
transferred wealth to total wealth at around 20 percent (Gale and Scholz, 1994; Modigliani, 1988a; Wolff 
and Gittleman, 2014). A severe problem for all three types of research is that bequests need not to be 
intended, but can be accidental (Gale and Scholz, 1994). For this reason, Kessler and Masson (1989) 
even state that that it is ‘virtually impossible to distinguish life-cycle from bequest savings' (p. 145). 
Obviously, the contribution of transferred wealth to total wealth is far from clear. 
Considering the unique characteristics and the numerous functions of wealth – as compared to income – 
differences in levels of wealth and levels of wealth inequality are likely to be more consequential in terms 
of social stratification. Social stratification becomes social inequality if access to social positions or social 
goods is unequal and if these positions or goods are systematically related to advantageous or 
disadvantageous conditions of acting and living (cf. Solga et al., 2009: 15). As already explained, due to 
its specific characteristics, the distribution of wealth is likely to be more unequal than the distribution of 
income, which has been empirically confirmed by a number of studies (Davies et al., 2008; Davies and 
Shorrocks, 2000; Frick and Grabka, 2009a). There are numerous studies which analyze the relationship 
between wealth and educational or occupational outcomes (Filmer and Pritchett, 2004; Nam and Huang, 
2009; Pfeffer and Hällsten, 2014), between wealth and health or mortality (Attanasio and Hoynes, 2000; 
Meer et al., 2003; Semyonov et al., 2013) or between wealth and well-being (Bonini, 2007; Headey et al., 
2008; Hochman and Skopek, 2013). These studies all try to establish whether differences in levels of 
wealth or levels in wealth inequality imply the same stratification consequences as differences in levels of 
income and income inequality, and if these effects persist even after controlling for income. A positive 
relationship has been found, for example, between wealth and education: Nam and Huang (2009) report 
a positive effect of parents' financial situation on their children's educational attainment in the Unites 
States, and Pfeffer and Hällsten (2014) find even more evidence for an intergenerational transmission of 
advantage through wealth. Controlling for parental income, the authors find children from wealthier 
families perform better in life in the United States, Germany, and Sweden. In Germany and Sweden, 
children from wealthier families show higher educational outcomes compared to children from less 
wealthy families. In the United States, parental wealth also has a positive effect on occupational status 
and income. In addition to that, the authors report that in all three countries,
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parental wealth impedes downward social mobility while at the same time increasing the chances for 
upward social mobility. Finally, wealth and health have also been found to be positively related. Moreover, 
wealth has been found to affect different dimensions of subjective well-being (quality of life, life 
satisfaction, depression), even when controlling for income. This indicates that wealth might not only be a 
distinct dimension of social stratification, but also of social inequality. We therefore argue that, for a 
comprehensive understanding of economic and social stratification, it is crucial that we go beyond 
inequalities derived from the labor market by also studying the distribution of private wealth. 
National differences in the distributions of wealth and income 
The main motivation of this article is to give the reader an initial idea of the distribution of private wealth 
across countries and to enable a comparison to the distribution of income. We do not aim to explain 
national differences in the distribution of wealth. However, in the following, we will suggest and discuss a 
number of possible factors that could explain national differences in the distribution of private wealth. 
Undoubtedly, individual and household characteristics strongly influence the process of wealth 
accumulation. Although the contribution of transferred wealth to total wealth is far from clear, it is 
plausible that earnings differences within and across countries translate into wealth differences to at least 
some degree. Empirical research reveals that income and wealth show only medium levels of correlation, 
and that in some countries the level of income inequality significantly deviates from the level of wealth 
inequality. In line with these findings, Cowell et al. (2013) assert that there are various reasons why levels 
of income and wealth inequality might differ from each other within countries, and why the distribution of 
wealth might vary across countries. First, they mention differences in the distribution of individual 
demographic and economic characteristics across countries as an important part of the explanation for 
national differences in levels of wealth and wealth inequality. These can be age differences (see also the 
life-cycle hypothesis of Modigliani and Brumberg, 1954, on the relationship between wealth and age), but 
also education, race, and marital status, which are found to be important micro-level determinants of 
national differences in private wealth (Conley, 2009; Henretta and Campbell, 1978; Keister and Moeller, 
2000; Oliver and Shapiro, 1990; Semyonov and Lewin-Epstein, 2013). In addition to these demographic 
variables, a growing number of scholars agree on the importance of psychological variables to 
complement them (Feldstein, 1995; Furnham, 1985; Thaler, 1990, 1994). Among these variables are self-
control, taste for saving, voting patterns, or other preference parameters like the degree of risk aversion. 
Second, a number of macro-level factors are likely to affect the distribution of private wealth. Cowell et al. 
(2013) suggest that both institutional settings and economic environments will affect households' saving 
motives and propensities. The standard life-cycle model developed by Modigliani and Brumberg (1954) is 
a powerful and flexible theoretical framework for explaining individual saving behavior, resulting in 
national differences in the distribution of wealth via differences in institutional settings. According to this 
model, saving behavior is the result of an optimization problem of inter-temporal consumption: Perfectly 
rational and forward-looking actors are faced with a deterministic income path with low earnings at the 
beginning of their career that increase over their working life and drop to zero when they retire. Trying to 
keep their marginal utility of consumption constant over time, they borrow at younger ages, save as their 
earnings increase, and ‘dis-save' in retirement. In the basic model, neither there are capital market 
imperfections nor is there uncertainty (e.g. earnings insecurity or uncertainty about the date of death). 
Saving is understood as earnings minus consumption. The only motivation for saving is provision for old 
age, and there are no bequests. Individuals work as long as they are able. In this situation,
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the introduction of a pay-as-you-go public pension system would consequently lead to a perfect 
substitution between public pension wealth and private savings. 
However, based on the findings of Cagan (1965) and Katona (1964), Feldstein (1974) argues that this 
only holds true for workers who planned to retire close to the official retirement age anyway. For workers 
who planned to retire later than that, the introduction of an official retirement age would generally induce 
them to retire earlier than they actually planned, since this will lengthen their total period in retirement. 
The introduction of a pay-as-you-go public pension system could motivate these workers to increase their 
savings. Thus, the implementation of a pay-as-you-go public pension system
1
 could also have a positive 
effect on the level of private savings, possibly offsetting the negative one. Either way, the standard life-
cycle model suggests that cross-country differences in public pension systems are a powerful explanation 
of international differences in the distribution of wealth. In an early time-series analysis, in fact, Feldstein 
(1974) found a strong negative relationship between social security (pension wealth) and aggregate 
capital accumulation. However, other time-series analyses found this relationship to be much weaker or 
even non-existent (Barro, 1978; Leimer and Lesnoy, 1982). 
Bringing transferred wealth back into the discussion, Cowell et al. (2013) further discuss national 
differences in the importance of past inheritances, and national differences in the population's age 
composition and household structure as representing possible explanatory factors for national differences 
in the distribution of wealth. In addition, national differences in the taxation of wealth (life-cycle wealth as 
well as transferred wealth), but also earnings, are likely to have an impact on national differences in the 
distribution of wealth. Various researchers suggest to further account for differences in financial literacy 
as an important determinant of saving behavior across, but also within, countries (Bernheim, 1998; Van 
Rooij et al., 2012). Differences in financial literacy might explain part of the finding that it is usually the 
highly educated/high-income households, which show a saving profile close to the assumptions of the 
standard life-cycle model, while the less educated/low-income households hardly save at all. In an 
international comparative study, Lusardi and Mitchell (2011) found financial literacy scores to be relatively 
high for individuals in Sweden and the Netherlands, but comparatively low for individuals in Italy and 
Russia. Similarly, Jappelli (2010) finds financial literacy to be high in Sweden, the Netherlands and 
Denmark, and low in Italy, Spain, and Poland. 
Finally, Cowell et al. (2013) mention nationally specific cultural and historical factors that shape 
preferences for holding specific types of assets (for example, real estate or stocks and shares) as an 
explanation for national differences in the distribution of wealth. In line with this argument, Feldstein 
(1995: 411) suggests the Europeans' shared experience of inflation and war as an explanation for the 
higher saving rates in the European population as compared to the United States,
2
 despite the greater 
generosity of social security retirement programs in Europe. Lusardi and Mitchell (2011) also claim that 
international differences in financial literacy can be the result of specific historical factors. They found, for 
example, that individuals in countries with recent experience of inflation scored higher on questions about 
inflation, and individuals in countries that experienced pension privatization scored higher on questions 
about risk diversification. 
Summing up, in their empirical analyses, Cowell et al. (2013) find that the largest share of national 
differences in the distribution of wealth cannot be traced back to differences in the distribution of 
individual characteristics, but rather to national effects, which they could, however, not explain in their 
analyses due to their small sample size.
3
 As suggested, and in line with other studies, they find relative 
levels of income and wealth inequality to be similar in some countries (e.g. the United States), while they 
strongly differ in others (e.g. Sweden). The following analyses contribute to the research on national 
differences in the distribution of private wealth. We will describe the distribution of wealth and compare 
national patterns of wealth inequality to those of income
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inequality. Therefore, before we present our analyses, we shall briefly trace national patterns of income 
inequality as detected by past research. 
The OECD (2008) publication ‘Growing unequal' provides an overview of income distributions in OECD 
countries over the period from the mid-1980s until the mid-2000s. It distinguishes five groups of countries. 
Denmark and Sweden belong to the ‘low inequality group', with Gini coefficients for income below 0.3. 
The ‘below average inequality group' exhibits Gini coefficients for income that are slightly below the 
OECD average, which is just above 0.3. Countries belonging to this group are Austria, Australia, Belgium, 
the Czech Republic, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, the 
Slovak Republic, and Switzerland. This group is followed by the ‘above average inequality group' that is 
composed of Korea, Canada, Spain, Japan, Greece, Ireland, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom. The 
fourth group is the ‘high inequality group', consisting of Italy, Poland, the United States, and Portugal. 
Turkey and Mexico form the ‘very high inequality group'. 
Data, variables, and methods 
Data 
In our empirical analyses, we make use of several data sources. The first dataset we use is the ‘SHARE'
4
, 
which provides rich and detailed information on household wealth and household income. So far, four 
waves have been conducted between the years 2004 and 2012. In order to balance for yearly variations 
in household income and household wealth, we include as many waves as possible. Wealth and income 
information were collected in the first, second and fourth wave. However, since the income measure in 
the first wave differs from those in the later waves, we do not make use of the first wave data. Our final 
wealth and income measures are thus calculated as the means of median wealth and median income in 
the second (2006/07) and fourth (2010/11/12) SHARE wave. Our final SHARE data sample consists of 18 
countries: Austria, Belgium, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, 
Israel, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, and Switzerland. As not all 
countries participated in all waves, for seven countries (Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Israel, Poland, 
Portugal, Slovenia), income and wealth information stems only from one wave. The SHARE study is an 
international, representative panel study of the population aged 50 years and above. Studying the 
distribution of wealth within this population segment, which has either already entered retirement or is 
close to it, allows us to investigate how successful individuals were in accumulating wealth over their life 
course. Still, it is a non-random fraction of the overall population and does thus not allow us to draw 
conclusions regarding the countries' overall populations. For this reason, and in order to enhance 
reliability of our results, we make use of another wealth data source. 
We derived aggregate-level data on the levels of private wealth and wealth inequality from the ‘GWD' 
published by the Credit Suisse Research Institute (2010, 2011, 2012, 2013). With these data books, the 
Credit Suisse Research Institute aims to provide the best available estimates of private wealth holdings 
for each of the world's current 216 countries. Anthony Shorrocks and Jim Davies are conducting the 
research for the GWDs. They apply a three-step procedure to derive the wealth measures as published in 
the data books, assembling and processing a number of different data sources from each country. In a 
first step, the researchers establish the average level of wealth for each country by using the household 
balance sheet (HBS) data, which were provided in 2013 by 47 countries.
5
 They combine these data with 
household survey data, which was available for four countries in 2013. Taken together, these 47 
countries cover 66 percent of the global population
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and 95 percent of total global wealth. The results derived from these data sources are finally sup-
plemented by econometric techniques which generate estimates of the level of wealth in 161 countries 
which lack direct information for one or more years (cf. Credit Suisse Research Institute, 2013: 5). 
The second step concerns the construction of the pattern of wealth holdings within nations. For 31 
countries, direct data on the distribution of wealth is available. For 135 countries, which have data on 
income distribution but not on wealth ownership, wealth holdings can be estimated based on the data for 
the 31 above-mentioned countries through exploitation of the detected relationship between wealth 
distribution and income distribution (cf. Credit Suisse Research Institute, 2013: 5). 
The third step addresses the fact that the traditional sources of wealth distribution data are unlikely to 
provide an accurate picture of wealth ownership in the top-tail of the distribution. Therefore, the authors 
make use of the information in the ‘Rich Lists' published, for example, by Forbes Magazine. With the help 
of this data, they can adjust the wealth distribution pattern in the highest wealth ranges. Table 5 in the 
Appendix 1 provides an overview of the different data sources that the authors applied to derive their final 
wealth measures as published in the GWDs. In addition, the last column provides information about the 
data quality of each country's wealth measures as calculated by Shorrocks and Davies. They built a five-
point scale to account for data quality. A five-point (‘good') rating means that the country has complete 
HBS data, and either wealth distribution data or a good basis for estimating the shape of the wealth 
distribution. A four point (‘satisfactory') rating means that the country fulfills all requirements of a ‘good' 
rating except that their HBS data does not cover non-financial assets. If a country has no HBS data but a 
household wealth survey or other wealth distribution data (from estate tax or wealth tax sources), it 
receives a three point (‘fair') rating. All 18 countries of our dataset range between three and five points of 
data quality. 
Data on levels of income and income inequality we derived from the OECD iLibrary (OECD, 2013). We 
merged the OECD income and the GWD wealth information for the overall (20+) population in the 18 
above-mentioned countries and derived a second data sample. To balance likewise for yearly variations 
in household income and wealth, we made use of all four GWD publications (2010-2013), and we chose a 
similar period for our OECD income measure (explained below). We will conduct all analyses separately 
with both data samples and compare results. 
As mentioned above, there exist at least two additional internationally comparative wealth surveys, the 
LWS and the HFCS. The LWS covers 12 countries over very different periods. For two countries (Finland 
and the Unites States), the data go back as far as 1994, while for the rest of the countries, the earliest 
wealth measures originate from either 1999 or 2000. For the Unites States, six waves are currently 
available (2000-2006). For all other countries, however, the LWS covers only two (Finland: 1994, 1998; 
Germany: 2001, 2006; Italy: 2002, 2004) or even only one point in time (Austria: 2004; Canada: 1999; 
Cyprus: 2002; Japan: 2003; Luxembourg: 2007; Norway: 2002; Sweden: 2002; United Kingdom: 2000) 
(cf. LWS Variable List, n.d.). Due to the heterogeneity of time points within these datasets, and because 
the countries only partly overlap with the SHARE countries, we decided to refrain from additionally using 
the LWS data. The second cross-national wealth survey, which started only very recently, is the HFCS. 
The first wave data was only released in April 2013. The HFCS covers 18 countries: Austria, Belgium, 
Cyprus, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Luxembourg, Malta, the 
Netherlands, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Spain. The HFCS would doubtless have been a 
worthwhile supplement to our SHARE and GWD/OECD data. However, because the HFCS covers only 
one point in time to date, and measures income in terms of gross income – whereas the SHARE and 
OECD data provide net income – we decided again to refrain from using it in this study, in order to keep 
problems of comparability to a minimum.
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Variables and methods 
Our two variables of main interest are household wealth and household income. Household wealth is 
measured in both surveys in terms of household net worth, which means real assets, plus financial 
assets, net of debts on them, and refers to current net worth at the time the interview was conducted. The 
second SHARE wave was conducted between 2006 and 2007 with the exception of Israel, where the 
second wave was conducted between 2009 and 2010. The fourth SHARE wave was conducted between 
2010 and 2012. The GWD wealth variables refer to the years 2010-2013. 
In the SHARE data, net worth is defined as follows: (1) gross real assets, that is, the ownership and value 
of the primary residence, of other real estate, of the share owned of own businesses and of owned cars; 
plus (2) gross financial assets, that is, the ownership and value of bank accounts, government and 
corporate bonds, stocks, mutual funds, individual retirement accounts, and contractual savings for 
housing and life insurance policies; minus (3) mortgages and financial liabilities (Christelis et al., 2005: 
358). The target population of individuals in the first SHARE wave is ‘all individuals born in 1954 or 
earlier, speaking the official language of the country and not living abroad or in an institution such as a 
prison during the duration of the field work' (Munich Center for the Economics of Ageing, 2013). In 
addition, spouses or partners living in the same household are interviewed independent of their age. 
A typical problem with questions addressing financial aspects is a high rate of item nonresponse 
(Riphahn and Serfling, 2005). This applies particularly to persons at the edges of the distribution (i.e. low 
and high earners). Losing cases due to missing values does increase the risk of ending up with a biased 
and probably highly selective sample (Kalwij and van Soest, 2005). Therefore, surveys usually apply 
specific techniques to impute these missing values. The SHARE data has been criticized for showing high 
numbers of missing values. Item nonresponse in the SHARE is relatively high for both the asset 
questions on the amount in checking and savings accounts and for the amount in stocks and shares. 
Percentages of missing values for these variables range from 4.5 percent in Sweden to 13.6 percent in 
France (Kalwij and van Soest, 2005: 131). However, Kalwij and van Soest (2005) were able to show that, 
compared to the very well-established English Longitudinal Study of Ageing (ELSA) and the Health and 
Retirement Study (HRS), the number of missing values for financial questions in SHARE is not 
significantly higher, and that in some regards the SHARE even outperforms the HRS. 
The SHARE team applies a multiple imputation strategy for filling in missing values for both household 
wealth and household income. Five values are estimated for every missing value. The values are imputed 
based on observed values of other respondents who are similar, in certain relevant aspects, to the 
respondent in question. Before applying the imputation procedure, however, the SHARE team applies the 
so-called ‘unfolding brackets' procedure. Respondents answering questions on financial values with 
‘Don't know' or ‘I'd rather not say' are asked a number of subsequent questions on whether the amount is 
larger than, smaller than, or about equal to a given amount. Kalwij and van Soest (2005) report that a 
large fraction of initial item non-respondents answered the bracket questions.
6
 
The SHARE team assumes that missing values are missing at random ‘conditional on the set of variables 
used to determine which respondents are similar to the respondent with the missing value' (Kalwij and 
van Soest, 2005: 128f; Little and Rubin, 1987). More precisely, they apply a two-stage imputation 
procedure. In the first stage, they impute a set of ten core variables (employment income, self-
employment income, public pension income per month, private occupational pension income per month, 
food expenditures per month, value of savings and checking accounts, value of stocks and shares, value 
of the house (for homeowners), housing rent (for renters)
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and out-of-pocket outpatient health care expenditures over the last 12 months). In the second stage, all 
other variables that suffer from item nonresponse are imputed, using the imputed core set variables as 
conditioning variables. 
Kalwij and van Soest (2005) also give an illustration of whether or not the imputations change the 
conclusions of an issue of interest to SHARE researchers by presenting an analysis of the association 
between the health status (self-reported health and grip strength) of the respondent and household 
wealth and income. In their analyses, they use two samples: the first sample includes all observations 
and the second sample includes only the observations for which no imputations have been made in any 
of the explanatory variables. In line with previous research, they find a positive relationship between 
income and health as well as between wealth and health in both samples. However, the magnitudes and 
significance levels differ. Effects of income and wealth are smaller in the model with imputed values. 
Based on these findings, we decided to work with the imputed values, which we understand as a more 
conservative approach. 
We run all the following analyses across the five imputations as provided by the SHARE team. All 
financial values are expressed in Euros and are adjusted for differences in the purchasing power of 
money across countries and over time using the purchasing power parity (PPP) values as provided by the 
SHARE team (see Munich Center for the Economics of Ageing, 2013). The reference category is 
Germany in the year 2005. Furthermore, we divided net worth values by the root of the number of 
persons living in a household (equivalized household net worth) to account for household size and to 
increase comparability of the net worth measures from SHARE (household net worth) and GWD 
(individual net worth). Our final net worth measure is the mean value of annual median household net 
worth in the second and fourth SHARE wave. Due to the strong skewness of the wealth distribution, we 
opted for median instead of mean wealth. In order to prevent problems of comparability of values of net 
worth across countries and between the two datasets to the greatest possible extent and to be consistent 
with previous research, we derived an additional wealth measure by dividing median net worth by median 
disposable income, and express net worth in times of disposable income. We label this measure ‘wealth 
rate'. 
The net worth measure in the GWDs is defined as the marketable value of financial assets plus non-
financial assets (principally housing and land) less debts for individuals aged 20 or above. All net worth 
values are expressed in Euros to make them most comparable to the SHARE data.
7
 For reasons already 
explained above, we decided on median net worth as the final wealth variable and, again, we calculated 
the wealth rate. Importantly, the current value of public and occupational pension plans is not included, 
neither in the SHARE nor in the GWD net worth measure. 
Household income in the SHARE waves two and four refers to yearly household net income in the year 
before the interview took place. Household total net income is equal to the sum of the individual-level 
values of all household members' annual net income from employment and self-employment; annual 
public old-age pensions, and other forms of public pensions; annual public long-term insurance 
payments; annual sum of private long-term care insurance payments; and annual life insurance payment 
received. To this, the sum of the following household-level variables is added: annual other household 
members' net income, interest income from bank accounts, interest income from bonds, dividends from 
stocks and shares, and interest and dividend income from mutual funds (Munich Center for the 
Economics of Ageing, 2013: 31). Our final SHARE income measure is the mean of median PPP-adjusted 
annual net household income from waves two and four. All values are expressed in Euros, and divided by 
the root of the number of persons living in each household (equivalized household income) to account for 
household size. 
The OECD defines disposable income as ‘Household net adjusted disposable income', that is, the 
average amount of money that a household earns per year, after taxes. Again, we express all income 
values in Euros. To likewise balance yearly variation in income, our income measure is
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calculated as the mean of median disposable household income of the years 2007-2010, in order to come 
closest to the period the GWD wealth measure is based upon. 
In our descriptive analyses, for the SHARE data, we apply weights in accordance with the rec-
ommendations of the SHARE team. We use cross-sectional calibrated weights that compensate for unit 
nonresponse and sample attrition in the CAPI interviews (Munich Center for the Economics of Ageing, 
2013: 40). The level of inequality in income and wealth we measure via the Gini coefficient, which is 
provided for the GWD and OECD data and which we calculated for the SHARE data according to the 
following formula 
𝐺(𝑊) = [
1
2𝑛2𝜇
]∑𝑛
𝑛
𝑖=1
∑|𝑤𝑖 − 𝑤𝑗|
𝑗=1
 
with inequality G in wealth w (or likewise in income y) measured by the arithmetic average of the absolute 
difference between all wealth (or income) pairs standardized by dividing it by the population's average 
wealth (or income). As a result the Gini index ranges from 0 (total equality) to 1 (total inequality). Apart 
from being the best known measure of inequality in social sciences, Gini has another considerable 
advantage for our purpose: it is well defined for negative and zero values (Jenkins and Jäntti, 2005: 20),
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which are likely to appear in the distribution of private net worth. We express all Gini values as multiplied 
by 100. 
In order to categorize countries by their resemblance in terms of income inequality and wealth inequality, 
we use a standard hierarchical cluster analysis method, the Ward's linkage cluster analysis. Hierarchical 
cluster analysis algorithms are either agglomerative or divisive: The latter begin by including all of the 
observations in one cluster and subsequently proceed to split them into smaller clusters; the former, on 
the other hand, start with each observation being treated as a separate cluster and proceed to combine 
those until the threshold level in a dissimilarity measure is reached. The Ward's linkage cluster analysis is 
an agglomerative method that minimizes the error sum of squares of any two (hypothetical) clusters that 
can be formed at each step of clustering.
9
 At each stage, the method aims to minimize the increase in the 
total within-cluster error sum of squares. The Ward cluster analysis is regarded as very efficient but tends 
to create clusters of small though equal size (Everitt, 2011: 77ff). 
Analyses and results 
The distribution of private wealth 
Table 1 shows the distribution of net worth and disposable income as well as the wealth rate (median net 
worth divided by median income) across the 18 countries in our SHARE and GWD/ OECD datasets. 
Looking at median values of net worth, we can first see that – with only very few exceptions – net worth 
values are higher among the 50+ SHARE than among the 20+ GWD population, which corresponds to 
the assumptions of the life-cycle hypothesis. In the SHARE data, the highest values for median net worth 
can be found in Belgium (€180,820), Israel (€172,540), and France (€165,290), followed by Switzerland 
(€159,460). The lowest values can be found in Estonia (€24,140) and Hungary (€25,380). In the GWD 
data, the highest values for median net worth can be found in Italy (€99,970), Belgium (€92,670) and 
France (€71,310). The lowest values emerge in Poland (€7190), Hungary (€10,200) and the Czech 
Republic (€11,430). Trends in median net worth show a similar tendency in the two datasets, which can 
be understood as an indicator of good data quality. 
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Table 1. Median net worth (NW), median net income (INC), and wealth rates 
Country Country 
code 
NW median (€)  INC median (€)  Wealth rate (NW/INC) 
  
SHARE GWD  SHARE OECD  SHARE 
GWD/ 
OECD 
Austria AUT 83,700 58,960  17,400 22,440  4.8 2.6 
Belgium BEL 180,820 92,670  19,130 21,240  9.6 4.4 
Czech Rep. CZE 58,820 11,430  10,710 7600  5.8 1.5 
Denmark DNK 122,430 34,490  19,450 28,740  6.3 1.2 
Estonia EST 24,140 9880  4960 6420  4.9 1.5 
France FRA 165,290 71,310  19,590 20,840  8.4 3.4 
Germany DEU 92,570 38,960  17,130 20,020  5.4 1.9 
Greece GRC 102,64 32,980  11,090 12,590  9.3 2.6 
Hungary HUN 25,380 10,200  5820 4740  4.4 2.2 
Israel ISR 172,540 31,740  15,500 12,260  11.1 2.6 
Italy ITA 111,410 99,970  11,910 17,580  9.3 5.7 
Netherlands NLD 125,260 52,600  21,800 21,710  5.8 2.4 
Poland POL 26,080 7190  5600 5450  4.7 1.3 
Portugal PRT 67,550 25,500  5240 9350  12.8 2.7 
Slovenia SVN 88,840 25,300  12,610 13,270  7.1 1.9 
Spain ESP 131,730 47,960  10,250 14,550  12.8 3.3 
Sweden SWE 113,110 31,270  21,300 22,640  5.3 1.4 
Switzerland CHE 159,460 61,000  30,900 34,000  5.4 1.8 
GWD: Global Wealth Databooks; OECD: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. 
SHARE waves 2 (release 2.6.0) and 4 (release 1.1.1), GWD (Credit Suisse Research Institute 2010, 2011, 2012, 
2013) and OECD (2013). Own calculations. 
With regard to disposable income, readers have to be aware of the fact that, in the SHARE data, a 
meaningful fraction of each country's population is already retired and receives transfer incomes only 
(mainly pension income). The highest values for median net income in the SHARE data emerge in 
Switzerland (€30,908), Sweden (€21,294), and the Netherlands (€21,804) and in the OECD data again in 
Switzerland (€34,000) and Denmark (€28,740). The lowest values for median net income due to both 
datasets emerge in the Eastern European countries Estonia, Hungary, Slovenia and the Czech Republic, 
closely followed by the Southern European countries Portugal, Greece, Spain, and Italy. 
The next two columns show the wealth rate (median net worth divided by median income), relating a 
country's level of net worth directly to its level of net income. In the SHARE data, the highest wealth rates 
(wr) appear in Portugal and Spain, where older households hold values of median net worth more than 13 
times greater than their (last year's) disposable income. Portugal and Spain are followed by Israel (wr = 
11.1), Belgium (wr = 9.6), Greece and Italy (wr = 9.3). Also, in the GWD data, the two Southern European 
countries Italy (wr = 5.7) and Spain (wr = 3.3) show comparatively high wealth rates. High wealth rates 
emerge also in Belgium (wr = 4.4) and France (wr = 3.4). In general, wealth rates are much higher in the 
SHARE than in the GWD data, which should principally be a result of the different population groups in 
terms of age. The lowest wealth rates in the SHARE data emerge in Hungary (wr = 4.4), Austria (wr = 
4.8) and Estonia (wr = 4.9), and in the GWD data in Denmark (wr = 1.2), Poland (wr = 1.3), and Sweden 
(wr = 1.4).  
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Table 2. Gini net worth (NW), Gini net income (INC) and difference between Gini NW and Gini INC. 
Country 
Country 
code 
Gini NW 
 
Gini INC 
 
Diff. Gini (NW - INC) 
  SHARE GWD  SHARE OECD  SHARE GWD 
Austria AUT 56 70  33 27  23 44 
Belgium BEL 45 65  47 26  -2 39 
Czech Rep. CZE 49 71  36 26  13 46 
Denmark DNK 54 93  30 24  24 69 
Estonia EST 67 68  52 32  15 36 
France FRA 51 74  39 30  12 44 
Germany DEU 57 75  39 29  18 46 
Greece GRC 45 69  43 33  2 35 
Hungary HUN 51 64  38 27  13 37 
Israel ISL 60 78  47 37  13 41 
Italy ITA 51 63  41 32  10 32 
Netherlands NLD 58 75  39 29  19 46 
Poland POL 56 73  35 31  21 42 
Portugal PRT 51 71  72 35  -21 36 
Slovenia SVN 51 63  57 24  -6 38 
Spain ESP 48 63  45 32  3 31 
Sweden SWE 55 82  31 27  24 55 
Switzerland CHE 61 82  39 30  22 53 
GWD: Global Wealth Databooks; OECD: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. 
SHARE waves 2 (release 2.6.0) and 4 (release 1.1.1), GWD (Credit Suisse Research Institute 2010, 
2011, 2012, 2013) and OECD (2013). Own calculations. 
Altogether, high levels of median wealth (in times of median income) emerge in the Southern European 
countries (SHARE: Greece, Portugal, Spain; GWD/OECD: Italy, Portugal, Spain), where median income 
is comparatively low, but also in Belgium (SHARE and GWD/OECD) and Israel (SHARE). Low levels of 
median wealth (in times of median income) emerge in the Eastern European countries (SHARE: Estonia, 
Hungary, Poland; GWD/OECD: Estonia, Poland), where median income is low as well, but also in Austria 
(SHARE) and in the Northern European countries Denmark and Sweden (GWD/OECD), where median 
income is high. 
National patterns of wealth and income inequality 
Table 2 shows our findings for the levels of income and wealth inequality in the SHARE and the 
GWD/OECD datasets. In the SHARE data, the highest values for inequality in net worth emerge in 
Estonia (Gini = 67), Switzerland (Gini = 61) and Israel (Gini = 60), in the GWD data in Denmark (Gini = 
93), Sweden (Gini = 82), and Switzerland (Gini = 82). The lowest values for wealth inequality according to 
the SHARE data emerge in Belgium and Greece (Gini = 45), Spain (Gini = 48), and the Czech Republic 
(Gini = 49), and according to the GWD data in Italy, Slovenia, and Spain (Gini = 63), followed by Hungary 
(Gini = 64) and Belgium (Gini = 65). The trends in the levels of wealth inequality reported by the SHARE 
data resemble those found in the GWD data for most countries. Exceptions are Estonia, which shows a 
below-median level of wealth inequality in the GWD data, but a level of wealth inequality considerably 
above the median in the SHARE data. Similar strong differences between the two datasets emerge for 
Slovenia.
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The highest income inequalities according to the SHARE data can be found in Portugal (Gini = 72) and 
Slovenia (Gini = 57), and according to the OECD data in Portugal (Gini = 35) and Israel (Gini = 37). The 
lowest values for income inequality emerge in Denmark (Gini = 30), Sweden (Gini = 31) and Austria (Gini 
= 33) according to the SHARE data, and in Denmark and Slovenia (Gini = 24), followed by Belgium and 
the Czech Republic (Gini = 26) and then Austria, Hungary, and Sweden (Gini = 27) according to the 
OECD data. As to the national patterns of income inequality, the results of the SHARE resemble those of 
the OECD data and those of past research. In general, income inequalities are higher among the 50+ 
population than among the 20+ population. We were able to find meaningful differences between the two 
datasets for Slovenia and Belgium. While the SHARE data reports above-median levels of income 
inequality in those countries, in the OECD data they are below-median level. 
Altogether, the lowest levels of wealth inequality we find in the Southern European countries which 
showed the highest wealth rates (SHARE, GWD: Greece, Italy, Spain), but also in Belgium and Slovenia 
(SHARE, GWD). Surprisingly, we find the highest levels of wealth inequality in the Northern European 
countries Sweden (SHARE, GWD) and Denmark (GWD), which show the lowest levels of income 
inequality but also in Switzerland (SHARE, GWD). Central and Eastern European countries are 
distributed over the full range of levels of wealth inequality. 
The last two columns show the differences between the Gini values for income and wealth inequality for 
each country. This informs us whether a country's levels of income and wealth inequality are either similar 
to or different from each other. We can see first that, in all countries except Belgium, Portugal, and 
Slovenia (but only in the SHARE data), levels of wealth inequality are higher than levels of income 
inequality, which is in line with theory as well as with past empirical findings (e.g. Davies et al., 2008). 
Similar levels of income and wealth inequality in the SHARE data can be found in Belgium, Greece, 
Slovenia, and Spain. Large discrepancies emerge in Denmark, Sweden, Austria, and Switzerland. 
According to the GWD/OECD data, income and wealth inequalities are similar in Spain, Italy and Greece, 
and more dissimilar in Denmark, Sweden, and Switzerland. As before, trends emerging from the SHARE 
data, on the one hand, and from the GWD/OECD data, on the other hand, are similar to each other, 
indicating good data quality, but may also point to the relative stability of patterns of wealth inequality over 
the life course. 
Figure 1 (SHARE data) and Figure 2 (GWD/OECD data) illustrate the findings of Table 2 in simple 
scatterplots and show the results of our cluster analyses. For both datasets, we applied a Ward's linkage 
cluster analysis. In the SHARE data, we opted for a 4-cluster solution, while in the GWD data, we 
prioritized the 6-cluster solution.10 The thick lines represent median levels of income and wealth 
inequality (Gini) over all countries in each dataset. We can see, first, that there is a larger variance of 
levels of income inequality in the SHARE (older population) than in the OECD (overall population) 
dataset, while variance in levels of wealth inequality is larger in the GWD (overall population) than in the 
SHARE (older population) data. The median level of income inequality is higher in the SHARE (Gini = 39) 
than in the OECD (Gini = 29) data, and the median level of wealth inequality is higher in the GWD (Gini = 
71) than in the SHARE (Gini = 54) data. Second, the heterogeneity and variance with regard to national 
levels of income and wealth inequality is larger in the GWD than in the SHARE data. 
In the SHARE data we find two larger clusters (each made up of seven countries) and two smaller 
clusters (each made up of two countries). In Table 3, for each cluster of the SHARE data, the Gini 
coefficients for income and wealth as well as the difference between levels of wealth and income are 
displayed. We sorted clusters in ascending order according to the numerical difference between levels of 
wealth and income inequality. The first cluster is a special cluster, characterized by a level of wealth 
inequality which is below the level of income inequality. This cluster consist of Portugal and Slovenia. The 
countries in the second cluster can be characterized by medium  
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Figure 1. Gini of income and wealth inequality: SHARE data. 
Source: SHARE waves 2 (release 2.6.0) and 4 (release 1.1.1). Own calculations. 
 
Figure 2. Gini of income and wealth inequality: GWD/OECD data. 
Source: GWD (Credit Suisse Research Institute, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013) and OECD (2013). Own 
calculations. 
levels of income inequality and below average levels of wealth inequalities. It consists of three Southern 
European countries (Spain, Greece, and Italy), but also two Central European countries (Belgium and 
France) and two Eastern European countries (Hungary and the Czech Republic). The third cluster is 
made up of two countries (Israel and Estonia) that show very high levels of income inequality combined 
with very high levels of wealth inequality. Finally, the fourth cluster consists 
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Table 3. Country clusters as emerged in the SHARE data. 
Cluster Countries Gini NW Gini INC Diff. Gini (NW - INC) 
1 PRT, SVN 51 64 -13 
2 ESP, GRC, BEL, ITA, FRA, HUN, CZE 50 41 9 
3 ISR, EST 65 50 15 
4 AUT, SWE, DNK, DEU, POL, NLD, CHE 57 35 22 
GWD: Global Wealth Databooks; OECD: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. 
SHARE waves 2 (release 2.6.0) and 4 (release 1.1.1), GWD (Credit Suisse Research Institute 2010, 
2011, 2012, 2013) and OECD (2013). Own calculations. 
Table 4. Country clusters as emerged in the GWD/OECD data. 
Cluster Countries Gini NW Gini INC Diff. Gini (NW - INC) 
1 EST, GRC, PRT, ITA, EST 67 32 35 
2 BEL, HUN, SVN 64 26 38 
3 ISR 78 37 41 
4 AUT, CZE, DEU, FRA, NLD, POL 73 28 45 
5 SWE, CHE 82 28 54 
6 DNK 93 24 69 
GWD: Global Wealth Databooks; OECD: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. 
SHARE waves 2 (release 2.6.0) and 4 (release 1.1.1), GWD (Credit Suisse Research Institute 2010, 
2011, 2012, 2013) and OECD (2013). Own calculations. 
of the two Northern European countries in the SHARE data (Denmark and Sweden), as well as of four 
Central European countries (Austria, Germany, the Netherlands, and Switzerland) and one Eastern 
European country (Poland). These countries can be characterized by levels of income and wealth 
inequality close to the average levels of these two measures. 
With the GWD/OECD data, we opt for a 6-cluster solution. Table 4 gives an overview of the levels of 
income and wealth inequality of each of these clusters as well as the absolute distance between the two 
measures. Again, we sorted clusters in ascending order according to the numerical difference between 
levels of wealth and income inequality. In the GWD/OECD data, we do find no countries with levels of 
wealth inequality below levels of income inequality. The first cluster is made up of countries with above 
average levels of income inequality but below or close to average levels of wealth inequality. This cluster 
consists of all four Southern European countries in the data (Greece, Italy, Portugal, and Spain) and one 
Eastern European country (Estonia). The countries of the second cluster show, likewise, below or close to 
average levels of wealth inequality combined with below average levels of income inequality. These are 
two Eastern European countries (Hungary, Slovenia) and one Central European country (Belgium). Israel 
makes up the third cluster, showing above average levels of wealth and income inequality. The fourth 
cluster is fairly similar to the fourth SHARE cluster. It combines countries with close to average levels of 
wealth and income inequality. Four Central European countries (Austria, Germany, the Netherlands, and 
France) and two Eastern European countries (the Czech Republic and Poland) make up this cluster. The 
fifth cluster consists of two countries, one Central European country (Switzerland), and one Northern 
European country (Sweden), which exhibit below or very close to average levels of income inequality 
combined with above average levels of wealth inequality. There remains another Northern European 
country, Denmark, which shows an extraordinarily high level of wealth inequality combined with a below 
average level of income inequality.
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Discussion and conclusion 
Despite its importance in the process of social stratification, previous research has paid too little attention 
to wealth, being preoccupied with the determination of individual attainment (Kenworthy, 2007). In the 
light of demographic and social changes, measures solely related to the individual's position in the labor 
market are increasingly less suited to capturing a society's level of social inequality. Only recently has 
there been a growing awareness among researchers that wealth is not merely an additional, but also a 
separate dimension of social stratification and of social inequality. With this article, we contribute to this 
growing awareness by drawing attention to wealth. 
More precisely, we addressed two research questions here. First, we wanted to find out how private 
wealth is distributed internationally, and second, we were interested to see if national patterns of wealth 
inequality resemble national patterns of income inequality. We applied the Ward's linkage cluster analysis 
to find clusters of countries, which are similar to one another regarding the levels of wealth and income 
inequality they exhibit. 
Theoretically, there are reasons to assume both similarity and dissimilarity in a country's levels of income 
and wealth inequality. It is important to mention that wealth can stem from two sources, transfers and self-
accumulation (income minus consumption). Wealth can be accumulated by saving (investing) parts of 
one's income. Saving depends first on the ability to save and second on preferences to save. Finally, 
saving also depends on the perceived necessity to save. If most of the wealth in a country is life-cycle 
wealth, then it is fair to assume that earnings differences strongly translate into wealth differences, 
controlling for individual preferences for saving. Past research, however, showed that there are 
meaningful differences in levels of income and wealth inequality for a number of countries (e.g. for 
Sweden: Roine and Waldenström, 2009). 
In our study, we analyzed and compared the distributions of income and wealth from two different data 
sets referring to two different population segments (SHARE: 50+ population, GWD/ OECD: 20+ 
population) in 17 European countries and Israel. Our results showed the following: first, we found 
meaningful differences in levels of household wealth between countries, and second, we found levels of 
wealth inequality to also differ strongly across countries. This clustering only partly corresponds to the 
national grouping based on levels of income inequality. We found as many countries with similar levels of 
income and wealth inequality as countries with strong differences in their levels of income and wealth 
inequality. 
We applied hierarchical clustering methods to find clusters of countries that are similar to each other with 
regard to their levels of income and wealth inequality. In the SHARE data we selected a 4-cluster 
solution, while in the GWD/OECD data we opted for a 6-cluster solution. Although we found the clusters 
of the two datasets to significantly differ from one another, we also found some very interesting 
similarities. First, in both datasets the Southern European countries are to be found in clusters that exhibit 
close to or above average levels of income inequality combined with below average levels of wealth 
inequality. The Northern European countries, on the other hand, combine close to or below average 
levels of income inequality with above average levels of wealth inequality in both datasets. In addition, 
Switzerland shows an average level of income inequality with above average levels of wealth inequality in 
both datasets. Outlying in both datasets is Israel, with above average levels in both income and wealth 
inequality. The Central and Eastern European countries, however, we found to be distributed over 
different clusters. 
Most surprising is certainly the finding that the Northern European countries – known for their high level of 
social equality – exhibit high levels of wealth inequality, although a number of studies have already 
reported this phenomenon, most of them for Sweden (Domeij and Klein, 2002; Piketty, 2014: 344f; Roine 
and Waldenström, 2009; Sierminska et al., 2006), and also several for Denmark (Bjørnskov et al., 2012; 
Davies et al., 2009). Domeij and Klein (2002: 505) suggest that the generous public pension system in 
Sweden (with a common benefit payable to each senior, as
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well as an upper limit to earnings-related pension benefits) can explain the differences in the levels of 
income and wealth inequality to a large degree, as it reduces incentives for the low income-earners to 
save proportionately more compared to the high-income earners. Roine and Waldenström (2009) add 
that the wealth concentration in Sweden increased dramatically after 1980, due to ‘dramatic increases in 
stock returns at the Stockholm Stock Exchange between 1980 and 2000' (p. 170). In the same period, the 
value of large privately held family firms, making up an important share of Swedish private net worth, 
grew rapidly (Roine and Waldenström, 2009: 169). For Denmark, Davies et al. (2009) report a Gini 
coefficient for wealth inequality in 1996 of 0.81.11 This is similar to our mean Gini of 0.93 as reported in 
the GWD data for the years 2010-13. Possible explanations for the extraordinarily high level of wealth 
inequality in Denmark are the easy access to mortgage or loans accompanied by a high level of debts in 
the Danish population, as well as the low number of homeowners. Andersen et al. (2012) report a very 
high debt-to-income ratio in Danish households when compared to other nations. However, they 
acknowledge that the largest share of debts is held by high-income families, indicating that the debt is 
often raised in order to finance purchases of luxury goods (e.g. a larger home) (Andersen et al., 2012: 1). 
Nevertheless, there is still a reasonable percentage of household with positive net debt of more than 30 
percent (Andersen et al., 2012: 1), which is likely to drive the high level of wealth inequality in Denmark. 
An aspect not considered in this article is the composition of wealth. National differences in the household 
wealth portfolio are, however, an important determinant of national differences in the distribution of 
wealth, as shown by past research (Keister and Moeller, 2000; Skopek et al., 2012; Spilerman, 2000) and 
share different advantages and disadvantages. Compared to financial assets such as shares, bonds, or 
money in bank accounts, housing wealth is, for example, much less mobile and less easy to liquidize. On 
the other hand, compared to real assets, financial assets are much more subject to interest rate changes 
and inflation. 
Among the different types of wealth, owner-occupied housing is of particular importance as it is the 
quantitatively most important component of household wealth in most countries in our analysis (cf. Kolb et 
al., 2013). Moreover, housing wealth was found to have an equalizing effect on wealth inequality in these 
countries (Skopek et al., 2012). Households in the Mediterranean countries, for example, hold most of 
their wealth in the form of residential property, which is of much less importance in Germany, where 
households' wealth portfolios are more diversified. In Denmark, the share of homeowners is 
extraordinarily low. In 2010, only 43 percent of all households were homeowners, meaning that 57 
percent were tenants (Bjørnskov et al., 2012). Various studies have found that the Danish 
homeownership rates have stagnated or even decreased over the last decade (Pohl Nielsen and Blume 
Jensen, 2011; Skak, 2006), which stands in contrast to other European and North-American countries. 
There seems to be a positive correlation between high rates of homeownership, on the one hand, and 
high median values of net worth together with comparatively low levels of wealth inequality, on the other 
hand. At the same time, the high rate of home-ownership, correlating with a high level of net worth, in the 
Mediterranean countries might be a result of the poor performance of the public pension system. A recent 
study of Frick and Grabka (2013) supports this argument. The authors criticize the fact that the ‘standard' 
concept of net worth as applied in most surveys ignores any entitlements to public pension schemes. In 
their study, based on German panel data, Frick and Grabka (2013) calculate an extended measure of 
wealth by combining public pension and private wealth. Doing this, median net worth increases by 70 
percent, with public pension entitlements making up about 40 percent of total net worth. In addition, the 
level of wealth inequality (Gini coefficient) is reduced by one quarter, suggesting an impact of public 
pension wealth not only on a country's level of wealth, but also on its level of wealth inequality.
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Moreover, we did not pay special attention to the importance of inheritances or transfers. While it is not 
clear, which is the contribution of inherited or transferred wealth to total wealth, one can assume that if 
most wealth is transferred wealth, the distribution of wealth might be much more dependent on the 
taxation of wealth or inheritances. This becomes even more important in the light of the expected 
‘inheritance wave'. The last 70 years have been a period of peace and economic prosperity in most 
industrialized countries of the Western world. During this time, households have been able to accumulate 
substantial amounts of wealth. The cohort living and working during this period is now in its 50s-70s and 
is expected to bequeath a historically unprecedented amount of wealth to their children (the baby boomer 
generation, born between 1946 and 1964) and grandchildren. For Germany, researchers expect a trillion 
Euros more to be inherited between 2010 and 2020 as compared to the decade before, which represents 
an increase of 50 percent (Die Welt, 2011). Similar amounts of wealth are expected, for example, for the 
baby boomers in Canada (Yew, 2012). However, researchers are divided over the impact of inheritances 
on the distribution of wealth (Karagiannaki, 2011; Kohli et al., 2006; Szydlik, 2004). 
So what do these findings imply? First and foremost, our results strongly suggest that income and wealth 
should be treated as two distinct dimensions of social stratification. In light of the growing importance of 
wealth as an income substitute in older age and during retirement, stratification research should focus on 
wealth inequalities in order to gain a comprehensive understanding of the level of social inequality in 
modern societies. Moreover, the results of our article can be understood as an indicator that the current 
definition of poverty – which is based solely on income in Europe and on income combined with 
consumption in the Unites States – is too shortsighted. Considering wealth in addition to income can 
significantly change the economic position of a household or individual. Summing up, we propose that our 
article lays an important foundation for research on the sources and consequences of wealth and wealth 
inequality. Especially interesting, in this respect, are the groups of nations with different levels of income 
and wealth inequality: broadly, the Northern and Southern European countries. 
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Notes 
1. In all countries we analyze, the public pension system is a pay-as-you-go financed system or has 
been so until very recently. 
2. The Unites States, however, is not considered in this article. 
3. Their sample consisted of five countries: the United Kingdom, Finland, Italy, the United States and 
Sweden. 
4. This chapter uses data from SHARE wave 4 release 1.1.1, as of March 28th 2013(DOI: 
10.6103/SHARE.w4.111) and SHARE wave 2 release 2.6.0, as of November 29 2013 (DOI: 
10.6103/SHARE. w1.260 and 10.6103/SHARE.w2.260). The SHARE data collection has been 
primarily funded by the European Commission through the 5th Framework Programme (project 
QLK6-CT-2001-00360 in the thematic programme Quality of Life), through the 6th Framework 
Programme (projects SHARE-I3, RII-CT-2006-062193, COMPARE, CIT5-CT-2005-028857, and 
SHARELIFE, CIT4-CT-2006-028812) and through the 7th Framework Programme (SHARE-PREP, 
N° 211909, SHARE-LEAP, N° 227822 and 
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SHARE M4, N° 261982). Additional funding from the U.S. National Institute on Aging (U01 
AG09740-13S2, P01 AG005842, P01 AG08291, P30 AG12815, R21 AG025169, Y1-AG-4553-01, 
IAG BSR06-11 and OGHA 04-064) and the German Ministry of Education and Research as well as 
from various national sources is gratefully acknowledged (see http://www.share-project.org for a full 
list of funding institutions). 
5. However, 30 of these countries cover only financial assets and debts. 
6. For example, for stocks and shares, 46.1 percent of initial non-respondents in SHARE completed the 
brackets in the first wave (Kalwij and van Soest, 2005: 128). 
7. We used exchange rates as provided by the OECD (OECD.StatExtracts, 2014) to convert USD, the 
currency provided by the GWD, into Euros. 
8. This, however, applies only under the assumption that mean wealth is positive, which is the case here. If 
mean wealth is negative, the Gini coefficient will also take on negative values (Jenkins and Jäntti, 2005). 
9. For a detailed description of the method see Everitt (2011). 
10. We based our decision on the increase in the squared Euclidean distance measure as shown by a 
dendrogram, which is a two-dimensional diagram illustrating the fusions or divisions made at each stage 
of the hierarchical classification process (cf. Everitt, 2011). 
11. Data stem from the following: Statistics Denmark, National Accounts and Balance of Payments, Annual 
National Accounts ESA95, Balance Sheets for Financial Assets and Liabilities available under http:// 
www.statbank.dk. 
References 
Andersen AL, Christensen AM, Nielsen NF, et al. (2012) The wealth and debt of Danish families. Monetary 
Review 2: 1-40. 
Atkinson AB (1971) The distribution of wealth and the individual life-cycle. Oxford Economic Papers 23(2): 
239-254. 
Attanasio OP and Hoynes HW (2000) Differential mortality and wealth accumulation. The Journal of Human 
Resources 35(1): 1-29. 
Barro RJ (1978) The Impact of Social Security on Private Saving. Washington, DC: American Enterprise 
Institute for Public Policy Research. 
Bernheim BD (1998) Financial illiteracy, education and retirement saving. In: Mitchell O and Schieber S (eds) 
Living with Defined Contributions Pensions. Philadelphia, PA: Pension Research Council, pp. 38-68. 
Bjørnskov C, Neamtu I and Westergård-Nielsen N (2012) Growing inequality and its impact in Denmark. 
Country report for Denmark. Available at: http://gini-
research.org/system/uploads/509/original/Denmark.pdf?1373978704 
Bonini AN (2007) Cross-national variation in individual life satisfaction: Effects of national wealth, human 
development, and environmental conditions. Social Indicators Research 87(2): 223-236. 
Bourdieu P (1984) Distinction. Oxon: Routledge Kegan & Paul. 
Bourdieu P (1986) The forms of capital. In: Richardson J (ed.) Handbook of Theory and Research for the 
Sociology of Education. New York: Greenwood Press, pp. 241-258. 
Cagan P (1965) The Effect of Pension Plans on Aggregate Savings: Evidence from a Sample Survey. New 
York: National Bureau of Economic Research. 
Christelis D, Jappelli T and Padula M (2005) Wealth and portfolio composition. In: Börsch-Supan A, 
Brugiavini A, Jürges H, et al. (eds) Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe: First Results from the Survey 
of Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe. Mannheim: MEA, pp. 310-317. 
Conley D (2009) Being Black, Living in the Red: Race, Wealth, and Social Policy in America. Berkeley, CA; 
Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press. 
Cowell FA, Karagiannaki E and McKnight A (2012) Mapping and measuring the distribution of household 
wealth: A cross-country analysis. CASE working paper 165. Available at: 
http://sticerd.lse.ac.uk/dps/case/cp/CASEpaper165.pdf 
Cowell FA, Karagiannaki E and McKnight A (2013) Accounting for cross-country differences in wealth ine-
quality. CASE working paper 168. Available at: http://sticerd.lse.ac.uk/dps/case/cp/CASEpaper168.pdf  
484 
 
Credit Suisse Research Institute (2010) Global Wealth Databook 2010. Zurich: Credit Suisse Research 
Institute. 
Credit Suisse Research Institute (2011) Global Wealth Databook 2011. Zurich: Credit Suisse Research 
Institute. 
Credit Suisse Research Institute (2012) Global Wealth Databook 2012. Zurich: Credit Suisse Research 
Institute. 
Credit Suisse Research Institute (2013) Global Wealth Databook 2013. Zurich: Credit Suisse Research 
Institute. 
Dahrendorf R (1959) Class and Class Conflict in Industrial Society. Stanford, CA: Stanford University 
Press.  
Davies JB and Shorrocks AF (2000) The distribution of wealth. In: Atkinson AB and Bourguignon F (eds) 
Handbook of Income Distribution. Amsterdam; New York: Elvesier, pp. 605-675. 
Davies JB, Sandström S, Shorrocks AF, et al. (2008) The world distribution of household wealth. United 
Nations University UNU-WIDER research paper 03. Available at: 
http://www.wider.unu.edu/publications/working-papers/discussion-papers/2008/en_GB/dp2008-03/ 
Davies JB, Shorrocks AB, Sandström S, et al. (2009) The level and distribution of global household 
wealth. NBER working paper 15508. Available at: http://www.nber.org/papers/w15508.pdf 
Dell F, Piketty T and Saez E (2005): Income and wealth concentration in Switzerland over the 20th 
century. CEPR discussion paper 5090. London: Centre for Economic Policy Research. Available at: 
http://eml.berkeley.edu/~saez/dell-piketty-saezCEPR05suisse.pdf 
Die Welt (2011) Auf die Deutschen rollt eine Erbschafts-Welle zu. Available at: 
http://www.welt.de/finanzen/verbraucher/article13338273/Auf-die-Deutschen-rollt-eine-Erbschafts-
Welle-zu.html (accessed 28 August 2014). 
DiPrete TA and Eirich GM (2006) Cumulative advantage as a mechanism for inequality: A review of 
theoretical and empirical developments. Annual Review of Sociology 32(1): 271-297. 
Domeij D and Klein P (2002) Public pensions: To what extent do they account for Swedish wealth 
inequality? Review of Economic Dynamics 5(3): 503-534. 
Durkheim E (2008) The division of labor in society. In: Grusky DB (ed.) Social Stratification: Class, Race 
and Gender in Sociological Perspective. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, pp. 159-164. 
Elder GH (1975) Age differentiation and the life course. Annual Review of Sociology 1: 165-190. 
Elmelech Y (2008) Transmitting Inequality: Wealth and the American Family. Lanham, MD: Rowman & 
Littlefield Publishers. 
Everitt B (2011) Cluster Analysis, 5th edn. Chichester: John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. 
Feldstein M (1974) Social security, induced retirement, and aggregate capital accumulation. Journal of 
Political Economy 82(5): 905-926. 
Feldstein M (1995) Fiscal policies, capital formation, and capitalism. European Economic Review 39(3-4): 
399-420. 
Filmer D and Pritchett D (2004) The effect of household wealth on educational attainment: Evidence from 
35 countries. Population and Development Review 25(1): 85-120. 
Forrester JW (1961) Industrial Dynamics. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Forrester JW (1968) Principles of Systems. Cambridge, MA: Wright-Allen Press. 
Frick JR and Grabka MM (2009a) Wealth inequality on the rise in Germany. DIW Berlin weekly report no. 
10/2009, 28 May 2009. Berlin: DIW Berlin, vol. 5, pp. 62-73. 
Frick JR and Grabka MM (2009b) Zur Entwicklung der Vermögensungleichheit in Deutschland. Berliner 
Journal für Soziologie 19(4): 577-600. 
Frick JR and Grabka MM (2013) Public pension entitlements and the distribution of wealth. In: Gornick JC 
and Jäntti M (eds) Income Inequality: Economic Disparities and the Middle Class in Affluent Countries. 
Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, pp. 362-387. 
Furnham A (1985) Why do people save? Attitudes to, and habits of, saving money in Britain. Journal of 
Applied Social Psychology 15(4): 354-373. 
Gale WG and Scholz JK (1994) Intergenerational transfers and the accumulation of wealth. The Journal 
of Economic Perspectives 8(4): 145-160. 
  
485 
 
Grusky DB (ed.) (2008) Social Stratification: Class, Race, and Gender in Sociological Perspective, 3rd 
edn. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. 
Headey B, Muffels R and Wooden M (2008) Money doesn't buy happiness: Or does it? A reconsideration 
based on the combined effects of wealth, income and consumption. Social Indicators Research 87(1): 
85. 
Henretta JC and Campbell RT (1978) Net worth as an aspect of status. The American Journal of 
Sociology 83(5): 1204-1223. 
Hochman O and Skopek N (2013) The impact of wealth on subjective well-being: A comparison of three 
welfare-state regimes. Research in Social Stratification and Mobility 34: 127-141. 
Jappelli T (2010) Economic literacy: An international comparison. The Economic Journal 120(548): 429-
451. 
Jenkins SP and Jäntti M (2005) Methods for summarizing and comparing wealth distributions. ISER 
working paper series no. 2005-05. Available at: 
https://www.iser.essex.ac.uk/files/iser_working_papers/2005-05.pdf 
Kalwij A and van Soest A (2005) Item non-response and alternative imputation procedures. In: Börsch-
Supan A and Jürges H (eds) The Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe – Methodology. 
Mannheim: MEA, pp. 128-150. 
Karagiannaki E (2011) The impact of inheritance on the distribution of wealth: Evidence from the UK. 
CASE working paper 148. Available at: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/43895/1/CASEpaper148.pdf 
Katona G (1964) Private Pensions and Individual Savings. Ann Arbor, MI: Survey Research Center, 
Institute for Social Research, University of Michigan. 
Keister LA and Moeller S (2000) Wealth inequality in the United States. Annual Review of Sociology 26: 
63-81. 
Kenworthy L (2007) Inequality and sociology. American Behavioral Scientist 50(5): 584-602. 
Kessler D and Masson A (1989) Bequest and wealth accumulation: Are some pieces of the puzzle 
missing? The Journal of Economic Perspectives 3(3): 141-152. 
Kohli M (1986) The world we forget: A historical review of the life course. In: Marshall VW (ed.) Later Life: 
The Social Psychology of Aging. Beverly Hills, CA: SAGE, pp. 271-303. 
Kohli M (1988) Ageing as a challenge for sociological theory. Ageing & Society 8(04): 367-394. 
Kohli M, Künemund H, Schäfer A, et al. (2006) The impact of inheritance on the distribution of wealth. 
Vierteljahrshefte zur Wirtschaftsforschung 75(1): 58-76. 
Kolb K, Skopek N and Blossfeld H-P (2013) The two dimensions of housing inequality in Europe: Are high 
home ownership rates an indicator of low housing values? Comparative Population Studies 38(4): 
1009-1040. 
Kotlikoff LJ and Summers LH (1981) The role of intergenerational transfers in aggregate capital 
accumulation. Journal of Political Economy 89(4): 706-732. 
Landais C, Piketty T and Saez E (2011) Pour une révolution fiscale – Un impôt sur le revenu pour le XXIe 
siècle. Seuil/République de idées. Available at: http://www.revolution-fiscale.fr 
Le Bon G (1939) Psychologie der Massen. Stuttgart: Kröner. 
Leimer DR and Lesnoy SD (1982) Social security and private saving: New time-series evidence. The 
Journal of Political Economy 90(3): 609-629. 
Little RJ and Rubin DB (1987) Statistical Analysis with Missing Data. New York: Wiley. 
Lusardi A and Mitchell OS (2011) Financial literacy around the world: An overview. Journal of Pension 
Economics and Finance 10(04): 497-508. 
LWS Variable List (n.d.) Available at: http://www.lisdatacenter.org/wp-content/uploads/our-lws-
documentation-variable-list.pdf (accessed 23 November 2014). 
Mayer KU and Müller W (1986) The state and the structure of the life-course. In: Sørensen AB, Weinert 
FE and Sherrod LR (eds) Human Development and the Life Course: Multidisciplinary Perspectives. 
Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum, pp. 217-245. 
Meade JE (1964) Efficiency, Equality and the Ownership of Property. London: Allen & Unwin. 
Meade JE (1975) The Just Economy. London: Allen & Unwin. 
  
486 
 
Meer J, Miller DL and Rosen HS (2003) Exploring the health-wealth nexus. Journal of Health Economics 
22(5): 713-730. 
Michels R (1925) Zur Soziologie des Parteiwesens in der modernen Demokratie. Leipzig: Kröner. 
Modigliani F (1988a) Measuring the contribution of intergenerational transfers to total wealth. In: Kessler 
D and Masson A (eds) Modelling the Accumulation and Distribution of Wealth. Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, pp. 21-52. 
Modigliani F (1988b) The role of intergenerational transfers and life cycle saving in the accumulation of 
wealth. Journal of Economic Perspectives 2(2): 15-40. 
Modigliani F and Brumberg R (1954) Utility analysis and the consumption function: An interpretation of 
cross-section data. In: Kurihara KK (ed.) Post-Keynesian Economics. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers 
University Press, pp. 388-436. 
Mosca G (1950) Die herrschende Klasse. Lehnen; Auflage: Nach d. 4. Aufl. übers. von Franz Borkenau. 
Munich Center for the Economics of Ageing (2013) SHARE – Release Guide 2.6.0: Waves 1 & 2. 
Available at: http://www.share-project.org/fileadmin/pdf_documentation/SHARE_guide_release_2-6-
0.pdf (accessed 15 July 2014). 
Nam Y and Huang J (2009) Equal opportunity for all? Parental economic resources and children's 
educational attainment. Children and Youth Services Review 31(6): 625-634. 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) (2008) Growing Unequal? Income 
Distribution and Poverty in OECD Countries. OECD Publishing. Available at: http://www.oecd-ili-
brary.org/social-issues-migration-health/growing-unequal_9789264044197-en (accessed 20 June 
2014). 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) (2013) Income distribution. OECD 
Social and Welfare Statistics (database). Available at: http://stats.oecd.org (accessed 10 August 2014). 
OECD.StatExtracts (2014) National accounts: Annual national accounts: 4. Main aggregates: 4. PPPs 
and exchange rates. OECD.Stat. Available at: http://stats.oecd.org (accessed 25 April 2014). 
Oliver MM and Shapiro TM (1990) Wealth of a nation: A reassessment of asset inequality in America 
shows at least one third of households are asset poor. The American Journal of Economics and 
Sociology 49(2): 129-151. 
Pfeffer FT and Hällsten M (2014) Mobility regimes and parental wealth: The United States, Germany, and 
Sweden in comparison. SOEP papers on Multidisciplinary Panel Data Research 500. Available at: 
http:// www.diw.de/documents/publikationen/73/diw_01.c.411432.de/diw_sp0500.pdf 
Piketty T (2014) Capital in the Twenty-First Century. Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard Univ. 
Press. 
Pohl Nielsen C and Blume Jensen K (2011) Declining home ownership among young Danish adults: An 
affordability problem or just postponement? AKF working paper series. Available at: 
http://www.kora.dk/media/1259/udgivelser_2011_pdf_2837_declining_home_ownership.pdf 
Rasner A, Frick JR and Grabka MM (2011). Extending the empirical basis for wealth inequality: Research 
using statistical matching of administrative and survey data. SOEP papers on Multidisciplinary Panel 
Data Research 359. Available at: 
http://www.diw.de/documents/publikationen/73/diw_01.c.368374.de/diw_sp0359.pdf 
Riphahn RT and Serfling O (2005) Item non-response on income and wealth questions. Empirical 
Economics 30(2): 521-538. 
Roine J and Waldenström D (2009) Wealth concentration over the path of development: Sweden, 1873-
2006. Scandinavian Journal of Economics 111(1): 151-187. 
Semyonov M and Lewin-Epstein N (2011) Wealth inequality – Ethnic disparities in Israeli society. Social 
Forces 89(3): 935-959. 
Semyonov M and Lewin-Epstein N (2013) Ways to richness: Determination of household wealth in 16 
countries. European Sociological Review 29(6): 1134-1148. 
Semyonov M, Lewin-Epstein N and Maskileyson D (2013) Where wealth matters more for health: Cross-
national analysis of the wealth-health gradient. Social Science & Medicine 81: 10-17. 
Sierminska E, Brandolini A and Smeeding TM (2006) The Luxembourg Wealth Study – A cross-country 
comparable database for household wealth research. The Journal of Economic Inequality 4(3): 375-
383.  
487 
 
Skak M (2006) A short note on the non-increasing homeownership rate in Denmark. Working paper 
series of the Centre for Housing and Welfare. Available at: 
http://boligforskning.dk/sites/default/files/A_short_note._Morten_Skak[1].pdf 
Skopek N, Kolb K, Buchholz S, et al. (2012) Einkommensreich – vermögensarm? Die Zusammensetzung 
von Vermögen und die Bedeutung einzelner Vermögenskomponenten im europäischen Vergleich. 
Berliner Journal für Soziologie 22(2): 63-187. 
Solga H, Berger PA and Powell J (2009) Soziale Ungleichheit: Kein Schnee von gestern! Eine 
Einführung. In: Solga H, Berger PA and Powell J (eds) Soziale Ungleichheit: Klassische Texte zur 
Sozialstrukturanalyse. Frankfurt; New York: Campus Verlag, pp. 11-45. 
Spilerman S (2000) Wealth and stratification process. Annual Review of Sociology 26: 497-524. 
Statistics Sweden (2007): Wealth Statistics 2007. Örebro: Statistics Sweden. 
Szydlik M (2004) Inheritance and inequality: Theoretical reasoning and empirical evidence. European 
Sociological Review 20(1): 31-45. 
Thaler RH (1990) Anomalies saving, fungibility, and mental accounts. Journal of Economic Perspectives 
4(1): 193-205. 
Thaler RH (1994) Psychology and savings policies. The American Economic Review 84(2): 186-192. 
Van Rooij MCJ, Lusardi A and Alessie RJM (2012) Financial literacy, retirement planning and household 
wealth. The Economic Journal 122(2006): 449-478. 
Weber M (1922) Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft. Tübingen: Mohr. 
White BB (1978) Empirical tests of the life cycle hypothesis. The American Economic Review 68(4): 547-
560. Wolff EN (2002) Top Heavy: A Study of the Increasing Inequality of Wealth in America, 2nd edn. 
New York: New Press. 
Wolff EN (2006) International Perspectives on Household Wealth. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing. 
Wolff EN and Gittleman M (2014) Inheritances and the distribution of wealth or whatever happened to 
the great inheritance boom? The Journal of Economic Inequality 12(4): 439-468. 
Yew MA-T (2012) Baby boomers set to inherit $1 trillion. thestar.com, Available at: 
http://www.thestar.com/business/personal_finance/retirement/2012/02/20/baby_boomers_set_to_inherit
_1_trillion.html (accessed 28 August 2014). 
  
488 
 
Appendix 1 
Table 5. Data sources and data quality of the GWD wealth data by country. 
Country 
code 
Household balance sheet and financial balance 
sheet sources 
Survey sources 
 
Data quality 
 
 
Financial data Non-financial data   
AUT OECD and 
Oesterreichische 
National bank 
NA  Satisfactory 
BEL OECD NA  Satisfactory 
CZE OECD and Czech 
National Bank (CNB) 
OECD and CNB  Good 
DNK Eurostat Financial 
Balance Sheets and 
Statistics Denmark 
Statistics Denmark  Good 
EST OECD and Bank of 
Estonia 
NA  Fair 
FRA OECD and Banque de 
France 
OECD Estate tax returns; see 
Landais et al. (2011) 
Good 
DEU OECD and Eurostat 
Financial Balance 
Sheets 
OECD Socio-Economic Panel 
Study; see Rasner et 
al. (2011) 
Good 
GRC Eurostat Financial 
Balance Sheets 
NA  Satisfactory 
HUN Eurostat Financial 
Balance Sheets and 
Hungarian Central Bank 
NA  Satisfactory 
ISR OECD OECD  Good 
ITA Bank of Italy and 
Eurostat Financial 
Balance Sheets 
Bank of Italy and 
OECD 
Survey of Household 
Income and Wealth 
Good 
NLD OECD OECD DNB Household Survey 
(DHH) 
Good 
POL OECD and National 
Bank of Poland 
NA  Satisfactory 
PRT Eurostat Financial 
Balance Sheets and 
Banco de Portugal 
NA  Satisfactory 
SVN OECD and Eurostat 
Financial Balance 
Sheets 
NA  Satisfactory 
ESP Bank of Spain NA Survey of Household 
Finances; authors' 
calculations 
Good 
SWE Eurostat Financial 
Balance Sheets and 
Sveriges Riksbank 
NA Wealth statistics based 
on registers of total 
population; see 
Statistics Sweden 
2007) 
Satisfactory 
CHE OECD OECD Survey based on 
country wealth tax 
statistics; see Dell et al. 
(2005) 
Good 
OECD: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. 
Source: GWDs (Credit Suisse Research Institute, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013). 
